Research has shown that learning a concept via standard supervised classification leads to a focus on diagnostic features, whereas learning by inferring missing features promotes the acquisition of withincategory information. Accordingly, we predicted that classification learning would produce a deficit in people's ability to draw novel contrasts-distinctions that were not part of training-compared with feature inference learning. Two experiments confirmed that classification learners were at a disadvantage at making novel distinctions. Eye movement data indicated that this conceptual inflexibility was due to (a) a narrower attention profile that reduces the encoding of many category features and (b) learned inattention that inhibits the reallocation of attention to newly relevant information. Implications of these costs of supervised classification learning for views of conceptual structure are discussed.
Two assumptions have guided the study of concept learning ever since Hull (1920) . The first is that learning a category amounts to learning to provide a common label for a set of objects. This assumption is explicit in the field's standard supervised classification task, in which people label a series of visually presented stimuli. Learning is supervised, as experimenters wait for a response and correct the learner after every trial. New stimuli are often tested to assess what has been learned. Experimenters vary the structure of the categories (i.e., the distribution of features within and between categories) to establish the success of one model over another (e.g., that a model that abstracts the category prototype is superior to one that memorizes the category exemplars or vice versa). One influential example of this kind of work is Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) , who studied the difficulty of learning to classify eight exemplars into two categories for different category structures. Over the years, research has followed Shepard et al.'s lead by teaching people to group objects into a small number of arbitrary sets-usually two-and then examining the representations formed.
However, there are many others tasks besides supervised classification that require concepts. Inferring hidden properties of a plant (e.g., edible or not), using everyday objects (e.g., setting an alarm clock), and learning without an explicit teacher (unsupervised learning) are a few examples of tasks that likely contribute to what we know about concepts. Even so, there have been few studies examining how concepts arise from different kinds of learning tasks (but see the Inference Versus Classification section below). In particular, it is important to know how the representations formed in one learning task generalize to others.
A second assumption in category learning research is that categories learned in one context transfer to another. Consider the goal of distinguishing rose bushes from raspberry bushes. If the most diagnostic feature is the presence of berries, then the berry feature should receive the most attention (as both plants have thorns; Nosofsky, 1984; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a; Shepard et al., 1961) . However, when one must later distinguish raspberry from cranberry bushes, thorns are suddenly diagnostic, because although both have red berries, only the raspberry bush has thorns. In general, a feature's diagnosticity varies depending on the categories being contrasted. As we show in a section below (The Attention Optimization-Flexibility Tradeoff), people's ability to transfer knowledge across contexts requires a level of flexibility that seems to be at odds with findings from the supervised classification task and the models that have been developed to account for those findings.
The basis for predicting inflexible concepts from current learning models is their assumed attention learning mechanisms. The mechanisms of attention in many computational models of category learning (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Kruschke, 1992; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999) suggest that people learn to attend to only that information needed to distinguish the (usually, two) categories being acquired. Although this process leads to efficient learning, after learning one category distinction in which, say, cue A is most diagnostic, people should have trouble learning a second distinction in which B is the good cue, because prior classification experience has taught people to ignore it (Kruschke, 1996a; Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 2005) . Thus, whereas people do not seem to have trouble classifying across different real-life contexts, our models would suggest that they should. How do we reconcile the flexibility of real-life categorization with the rigidity of the categories acquired via experimental classification tasks? The hypothesis we explore here is that perhaps people acquire many categories in ways other than supervised classification to gain the flexibility needed to use their conceptual knowledge in different situations.
Our goal, then, is to explore the relationship between learning task and the flexibility of conceptual representations. We accomplish this by comparing the standard supervised classification task with a feature inference task (Yamauchi & Markman, 1998) . There are two points of comparison. The first is learners' flexibility in applying knowledge about previously learned categories to novel contrasts. The second is how different tasks lead to different patterns of attention allocation throughout learning. In the section that follows we review evidence that human learners produce an optimal, but inflexible, attention profile in the standard classification task. We then review findings from inference learning studies and suggest that inference learning may lead to less optimal but more flexible category representations. Because our arguments hinge on the idea that classification and inference will produce different attention profiles, to attain an online measure of attention we tracked subjects' eye movements while they learned categories. Because the use of eyetracking in the study of concept learning is recent, the final section preceding our two experiments reviews relevant work.
The Attention Optimization-Flexibility Tradeoff
That people can learn to attend optimally to stimulus dimensions underscores how classification performance and attention are linked. By attending optimally, a learner maximizes performance. It is generally accepted that people will attend to the most relevant dimensions when learning categories via supervised classification (A. L. Anderson, Ross, & Chin-Parker, 2002; Nosofsky, 1984) . Selective attention during category learning was first proposed by Shepard et al. (1961) , who discovered that standard principles of stimulus generalization alone could not account for the relative difficulty of learning categories. They tested the relative difficulty of learning six category structures with one, two, or three dimensions required to classify the stimuli and found that learning difficulty was correlated with the number of relevant dimensions: Discriminations that required the use of one dimension were easier to learn than those requiring two, which were in turn easier than those requiring three. These results were explained by assuming that people were attending to the relevant dimension(s) and ignoring the rest. Other studies (e.g., Kruschke, 1993) have shown that tasks with opportunities to use fewer dimensions (filtration tasks) are easier than tasks requiring more dimensions (condensation tasks). The intuition is simple: less to process, less to learn. According to this view, selective attention is a simplifying mechanism that people use to reduce the difficulty of learning (also see Haider & Frensch, 1999; Lee & Anderson, 2001) .
In response to such results, categorization models have incorporated the assumption that people will eventually optimize their attention to the most relevant dimensions. For example, the wellknown exemplar-based classification model, the generalized context model (GCM), assumes that subjects will distribute attention among the component dimensions so as to optimize performance in a given categorization paradigm. That is, it is assumed that the [attention] parameters will tend toward those values that maximize the average percentage of correct categorizations. (Nosofsky, 1986, p. 41) In the GCM and related models (e.g., ALCOVE; Kruschke, 1992) , as well as in prototype variants (Nosofsky, 1992; Smith & Minda, 1998) , attention changes the influence of dimensions. Increasing attention to dimensions that predict the category label and decreasing attention to those that do not improve classification performance by exaggerating differences between items of opposite categories.
Whether people will eventually learn to attend optimally when learning concepts via classification training is unquestioned. But does the classification task on its own result in representations like those of real-world concepts? This question arises from a problem we have observed with the notion of attention optimization. To continue the quote from above, "The distribution of attention weights that optimizes performance will depend on the particular category structure under investigation" (Nosofsky, 1986, p. 41) .
In other words, optimizing attention for one category contrast is not always optimal for another. This implies that the attention profile learned to improve classification performance in one context might actually reduce performance in another. For example, when people learn to distinguish between possums and raccoons in one context, and between cats and dogs in another, the attention profiles acquired may reduce people's ability to distinguish between possums and cats. The consequence of ignoring irrelevant dimensions for one set of category contrasts means that the learner has to re-attend to (and learn about) those dimensions when familiar categories are contrasted in novel ways. In this manner, the heralded powers of selective attention assumed by present theories may have a hidden cost when previously irrelevant dimensions become relevant.
Inference Versus Classification
The question of how attention profiles transfer to novel category contrasts may be less of a concern with other learning modes. Other tasks, where the learner is more focused on the properties of categories, may yield more flexible representations that readily support novel contrasts.
Research that has expanded the array of tasks that test concept acquisition theories (Markman & Ross, 2003; Markman, Yamauchi, & Makin, 1997) led us to consider a task that may produce flexible conceptual representations. Whereas classification involves predicting the category label from features, feature inference learning involves predicting a missing feature using information from other features as well as the category label. So, rather than determining that a plant is a raspberry bush because it has thorns and berries, the inference task asks learners to determine whether a raspberry bush has thorns or some other property.
The feature inference task has received recent attention because there is evidence that classification and inference learners process and represent conceptual information differently. For example, Chin-Parker and found that classification learners acquired the expected sensitivity to features to distinguish between categories. When categories were learned via inference, however, subjects became especially sensitive to within-category correlations of features. That is, when learning via inference, people were not only learning the relationship between berries and the label "raspberry bush," but they also noticed the correlation between the types of leaves and the presence of berries, or between the size of the thorns and the shape of the leaves (also see J. R. Anderson & Fincham, 1996) . Similarly, Chin-Parker and manipulated the diagnosticity and prototypicality of feature dimensions and found that classification tasks caused learners to become sensitive to just diagnostic features, whereas inference learners were also sensitive to nondiagnostic prototypical features (also see A. L. Anderson et al., 2002; Sakamoto & Love, 2006; Yamauchi, Love, & Markman, 2002; Yamauchi & Markman, 2000a , 2000b . Finally, Yamauchi and Markman (1998) found that inference learners were more likely than classification learners to infer prototypical category features and less likely to infer features associated with actual training items. Moreover, inference learners were able to learn linearly separable category structures in fewer trials than classification learners. Thus, despite descriptions of the inference and classification tasks being formally identical (J. R. Anderson, 1991) , there is the possibility that the nature of category representations can differ depending on the learning task.
This evidence suggests that whereas classification learning may foster attention to the diagnostic dimensions that serve to distinguish categories, inference learning may focus categorizers on within-category information. Our hypothesis is that because the within-category information acquired by inference learners is not tied to any particular set of contrast categories, such knowledge yields a more general and flexible representation. As a consequence, inference learners may be more successful on novel contrasts than classification learners.
To test this hypothesis, we asked people to learn Categories A, B, C, and D, shown in Table 1 . Each category possesses three binary dimensions whose values are designated as 0 or 1. These categories were acquired in two learning phases. Participants were first presented with examples from Categories A and B and later with examples from Categories C and D. We manipulated whether those categories were learned via supervised classification (e.g., an exemplar from either Category A or B is presented and the subject must respond with "A" or "B") or feature inference (e.g., an exemplar labeled an A or B is presented and the subject predicts a missing feature). After the two learning phases, participants were presented with test items requiring them to make a novel contrast, to designate an item as either A or C, A or D, B or C, or B or D. We predicted that, because they will attend selectively, classification learners will perform poorly on these novel contrasts. Because they will attend to Dimension 1 while learning As and Bs, and to Dimension 2 while learning Cs and Ds, they will learn to ignore Dimension 3, which is required to distinguish As and Cs. In contrast, because inference learners will acquire within-category information about all three dimensions, they should be successful on the novel contrasts.
Performance on the novel contrasts speaks to this article's central question: How do people acquire concepts so they can be used flexibly in many category contrasts? Results showing that supervised classification learning produces relatively inflexible representations will highlight the need to augment that task with other kinds of learning. An additional goal of this article is to uncover why inference training produces a different conceptual representation. To answer the question of whether people attend differently in inference and classification tasks, we used eyetracking as a measure of category learners' online attention allocation.
Using Eye Fixations to Measure Attention
The use of eye fixations as a measure of attention has enjoyed success in numerous research areas. There are many sources of evidence linking attention with eye movements, each underscoring how hard it is to fixate one part of our environment while something significant is occurring elsewhere. From the neuroscience literature, Moore and Armstrong (2003) demonstrated that the strength of the percept-enhancing effects of attention in perceptual brain areas (V4) is linked to retinotopic stimulation of frontal eye fields. Shepherd, Findlay, and Hockey (1986) demonstrated that although attending without making corresponding eye movements is possible, it is not possible to make an eye movement without shifting attention. More generally, the close link between attention and eye movements has been shown across a variety of cognitive tasks (see Liversedge & Findlay, 2000, and Rayner, 1998 , for reviews; also see Blair, Watson, & Meier, 2009; Blair, Watson, Walshe, & Maj, 2009 ). Mechanisms of attention are neurally and behaviorally coupled with eye movements.
There have also been demonstrations that eye movements can be a good measure of attention in learning experiments. For example, Kruschke et al. (2005) used eyetracking to contrast Kruschke's (2003) theory of attention learning with the Rescorla-Wagner model-two learning theories with different explanations of the well-known blocking phenomenon. Whereas Rescorla-Wagner proposes that nothing is learned about a blocked cue, attention learning theory proposes that people indeed learn something-that the cue should be ignored. Using eyetracking, Kruschke et al. (2005) found that people fixated the blocked cue less than not blocked cues, supporting the idea that learned inattention is the superior explanation for blocking. This finding corroborated Kruschke and Blair's (2000) discovery that people are slower to associate the blocked cue to a new outcome, presumably because they have stopped attending to it.
Finally, eyetracking has also been applied to the specific domain of category learning. For example, Rehder and Hoffman (2005a) used eyetracking to test the attentional assumptions of Nosofsky, Palmeri, and McKinley's (1994) rule-plus-exception (RULEX) model with Kruschke's (1992) exemplar-based ALCOVE model. Testing the Shepard et al. (1961) category structures, Rehder and Hoffman (2005a) found that most people fixated all dimensions at the onset and then decreased the number of dimensions fixated to only the relevant ones, a result predicted by ALCOVE but not RULEX (and directly confirming Shepard et al.'s conjecture that learners optimize their attention as part of concept acquisition). In 
another study, Rehder and Hoffman (2005b) replicated Medin and Schaffer's (1978) 5-4 category structure with an eye tracker and found that fixation times to stimulus dimensions matched the decisions weight estimated from behavioral responses of one model (Nosofsky's, 1984 (Nosofsky's, , 1986 , generalized context model) but not of a prototype model (Reed, 1972; Smith & Minda, 2000) . As this review illustrates, eyetracking is a good measure of learners' attention in a variety of cognitive tasks. The current study follows this work by measuring eye movements as people learn novel categories through classification or feature inference. We use these data both to investigate how inference learners acquire more within-category information and to assess learners' attention profiles as they make novel category contrasts (a new sort of test of learners' conceptual knowledge). Such attention profiles will inform when and how learners apply category knowledge in a flexible manner.
Experiment 1
Across two training phases participants learned Categories A, B, C, and D in Table 1 via inference or classification while we monitored their eye fixations. A test phase assessed accuracy and eye movements as people made novel category contrasts. Following prior research, we expected classification subjects to learn to ignore irrelevant dimensions during training. Attention optimization should result in good performance on the trained classifications but poor performance on novel classifications. In contrast, prior research has demonstrated a tendency for inference learners to acquire within-category information, potentially producing more flexible category representations, to support novel contrasts.
Note that one difference between the classification and inference training tasks is that only the former allows perfect performance. As Table 1 shows, Dimension 2 during A-B training and Dimension 1 during C-D training are uncorrelated with a category label (or the other feature dimensions), and, thus, those dimensions cannot be predicted above chance levels. Even so, we expected that the feature information acquired during A-B and C-D training would be sufficient to ensure good accuracy on the novel contrasts.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four New York University students participated for course credit. They were tested individually and were assigned randomly, in equal numbers, to standard supervised classification or to an inference task. Subjects were also assigned to one of six counterbalancing conditions corresponding to different ways of distributing the three dimensions to screen locations. Data from one inference subject were lost while being transferred from the eye tracker to a storage disk.
Materials. Subjects learned categories of "ceremonial symbols." Stimuli were generated from pairs of dimensions that had been pretested for approximately equal discrimination times (Hoffman, 2008) . The features of the symbols were 2 degrees of visual angle in diameter. There were 5 degrees separating the center of each feature and the center of the CRT. Adjacent locations were separated by 7 degrees of visual angle, and locations along the diagonal of the stimulus were separated by 10 degrees of visual angle. Thus, the average distance between any single location and another was (7 ϩ 7 ϩ 10)/3 ϭ 8 degrees. Examples are shown in Figure 1 . The top left of each symbol contained the category label. The other locations contained features.
The eye tracker was an SMI Eyelink I with a 1 ⁄4 to 1 ⁄2 degree of visual angle margin of error and 250 Hz temporal resolution. Student participants had normal vision or normal with corrective lenses. The eye tracker produced a rectangular gaze-contingent window of 4 ϫ 4 degrees of visual angle centered on subjects' gaze, so that when their gaze fell within the window, the feature in the display became visible, but if their gaze fell outside the window, the feature became jumbled. Gaze contingence ensured that subjects could extract feature information only by fixating its location. Figure 1D shows a jumbled stimulus that was presented to the subjects when they weren't looking at a stimulus feature. The jumbling was intended to prevent any use of peripheral vision to extract stimulus information, ensuring that when subjects were not fixating a location, they could not use the information in that location.
Classification task, Phase 1: A versus B. Table 1 presents a three-dimensional structure with Categories A, B, C, and D. Sub- jects were trained on these categories using different contrasts. First, categorizers learned to contrast As versus Bs. To classify As and Bs, they needed to use Dimension 1, in which a feature-value of 1 predicted Category A, and 0 predicted Category B. Dimension 2 was irrelevant, with 1s and 0s occurring in each category equally. Dimension 3 contained a 1 for all Category A and B members, so it could also not be used to discriminate A from B. Figure 2 shows the experimental procedure. Before each trial, we presented a drift correction, in which the subject fixated the point in the center to display the stimulus. In the classification trials, the top left of the stimulus contained category labels. For example, "A-B" meant that the subject must decide whether the item was an A or a B, the order indicating that the left button corresponds to A and the right button to B. The button assignments varied randomly from trial to trial.
There was no response deadline for classifying. However, immediately after a response, the category location was replaced with the correct category label, producing a chime for a correct response or a buzzer if incorrect. The complete stimulus with the correct category remained on screen for 4 s.
Each subject made classifications with both label orderings, which disassociated buttons and labels. The two unique Category A items and two unique Category B items were presented six times each, in random order (24 trials), with half of the items having the A-B label order and the other half with the B-A label order. Training continued for five blocks.
Classification task, Phase 2: C versus D. After classifying As and Bs, subjects in the classification condition learned a second contrast, between Cs and Ds. As Table 1 shows, this contrast required use of Dimension 2, with 1s predicting Cs and 0s predicting Ds. Dimensions 1 and 3 were irrelevant. Thus, the task was identical to the A versus B task but with a different relevant dimension.
Note that whereas Classification Task 1 had five blocks, Task 2 had four. The additional block in the first task was intended to allow learners to acclimate to the procedure.
Inference task, Phase 1: Categories A and B. The inference condition was nearly identical to the classification condition. Like classification learners, inference learners first learned about Categories A and B. However, instead of predicting the category label (i.e., classifying), inference learners predicted missing features. Figure 2 also shows the procedure for an inference trial. In the example inference trial shown in Figure 2 , the value of the dimension on the bottom left is unknown and the subject's task was to choose between the two features displayed there. The relative position of the feature options indicated button assignment; the left button selected the feature on the left, and the right button selected the feature on the right.
As we mentioned earlier, perfect performance on the inference task was unattainable. As Table 1 shows, when predicting missing features in As and Bs one should infer a 1 on Dimension 1 for an A and a 0 for a B; for Dimension 3 one should always predict a 1. But predictions on Dimension 2 must be at chance because neither the category label nor the other feature dimensions provide any information about the correct value on that dimension.
Inference learning on Categories A and B lasted for five blocks. In each block, each of the four category exemplars was presented six times. Every exemplar was presented with each of the three dimensions queried twice (once for each feature order). Exemplars were presented in random order, for a total of 24 trials per block.
Inference task, Phase 2: Categories C and D. Inference learning continued with the second set of categories in Table 1 for four blocks. As for the first inference task, perfect performance was attainable on only two of the three dimensions.
Novel contrasts. After the first two tasks, both classification and inference subjects were presented with classification trials involving contrasts between categories that were unpaired during training. For example, they were presented with a member of Category A or C and asked to classify it into the correct category. Novel contrasts were Category A versus C, B versus C, B versus D, and A versus D. It is important to note that correct responding on these novel contrasts required Dimension 3, which had been previously irrelevant during training. Dimensions 1 and 2 yield an accuracy of 87.5% and thus could not be used to attain perfect performance on these classification trials.
Whereas the subjects in the classification condition continued with the same task as in earlier training, the inference subjects now classified for the first time in the experiment. Accordingly, additional instructions were provided to the inference group before they classified the novel contrasts.
As during classification training, feedback was provided for all subjects. Subjects completed four blocks of 24 randomly ordered novel contrast trials. Each block was constructed by sampling with replacement from the 16 unique novel contrasts.
Results
Learning. Figure 3A shows the average proportion correct for the classification and inference training conditions. The inference condition is divided into three trials types depending on whether the queried feature dimension was 1, 2, or 3. Recall that different feature dimensions were correlated with the category label at different points in the experiment: Dimension 1 was perfectly correlated during A-B training, Dimension 2 during C-D training, and Dimension 3 during the novel contrasts. We first consider performance during A-B training, Blocks 1-5. Figure 3A indicates that the classification learners improved rapidly, approaching perfect performance (accuracy of .98) in Block 5. This was expected, given that Dimension 1 could be used to predict category membership. Inference learners also showed improvement predicting Dimensions 1 and 3, reaching accuracies of .86 and .98 in Block 5, respectively. It is likely that the better performance on Dimension 3 occurred because the correct answer was always the same, whereas for Dimension 1 it changed depending on whether the item was an A or B (see Table 1 ). It is interesting to note that accuracy on Dimension 1 was marginally worse than classification performance, t(21) ϭ 1.74, p Ͻ .10, even though those tasks can be seen as equivalent (classifiers could use Dimension 1 to predict the category label, whereas inference subjects could use the category label to predict Dimension 1). This difference may have arisen because the inference learners were also required to predict values on Dimensions 2 and 3, and because it was impossible to exceed chance performance on Dimension 2. Indeed, Figure 3 confirms that accuracy on Dimension 2 was at chance.
Analogous performance was observed during C-D training in which Dimensions 1 and 2 switched roles. By Block 9, classification accuracy reached .99 and inference accuracy on Dimensions 2 and 3 reached .81 and .95, respectively. Once again, inference subjects' performance predicting the one dimension that could be predicted from the category label (in this case, Dimension 2) was less accurate than the classification learners' performance, t(21) ϭ 2.66, p Ͻ .05. As required by the category structure (Table 1) , inference subjects were at chance on Dimension 1.
Basic eye movement statistics. We first present basic eye movement statistics for all subjects. The average median time per fixation across subjects was 253 ms (SD ϭ 38.86), and the average median saccade amplitude was 7.06 degrees of visual angle (SD ϭ 1.72). The most frequent saccade amplitude was 1 degree, reflecting saccades within the same stimulus location, and the second most frequent was in the 8 -10 degree range, corresponding to the 8-degree average distance between locations in the display. On average there were 12.5 fixations per trial (SD ϭ 4.83). Thus, saccades and fixations reflected the characteristics of the stimuli.
Fixations: A-B and C-D training. We next examined how learners' overall attention profiles differed between the two tasks. To determine the relative use of information on each trial, for each location (each feature dimension and the category label) we computed the proportion of time fixating that location by dividing its total fixation time by the trial's total response time (from stimulus onset until a response was made). The left panels of Figure 4 show the proportion of time fixating the category label and the three feature dimensions during A-B and C-D training averaged over blocks and subjects as a function of whether learners were predicting the category label (classification condition; Figure 4A ) or values on one of the three feature dimensions (inference condition; Figures 4C, 4D, and 4E).
Beginning with the classification condition, first note that subjects fixated the category location more than the feature dimensions throughout training, an effect of having to refer to that location to make a response (i.e., to determine which response button was associated with which category label; see Figure 1A ). More interesting is how subjects used the three feature dimensions to predict the category label. From prior work (e.g., Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a , 2005b we expected the typical classification learner to initially fixate feature dimensions about equally and then shift toward an optimal attention profile with training. This is what we found. In Block 1, the proportions of time that classification learners fixated each feature did not differ (F Ͻ 1). Thereafter, fixations shifted away from Dimensions 2 and 3 and toward Dimension 1, until by Block 5 people fixated only the category label and Dimension 1 ( Figure 4A ). That is, classification learners moved their fixations from irrelevant to relevant dimensions, until irrelevant dimensions were fixated rarely or not at all.
Attention optimization also occurred during C-D training. Classification subjects learned to fixate the category label and Dimension 2 and to ignore irrelevant Dimensions 1 and 3. On the last block of C-D training, subjects split their fixations between Dimension 2 and the category label. One difference with C-D training is that the feature dimensions were not initially fixated equally: The average proportion fixation time on the first trial of C-D training was only .05 and .03 for Dimensions 2 and 3, respectively, and most subjects did not fixate these dimensions at all. Because Dimensions 2 and 3 had been irrelevant during A-B training, this learned (in)attention transferred to the C-D task. Nevertheless, learners readjusted their attention toward Dimension 2 as required by the C-D task.
Eye movements during inference training are presented in Figures 4C , 4D, and 4E, and exhibit a different pattern than classification training. For example, Figure 4C shows the proportions of fixations when Dimension 1 was queried. The figure shows that Dimension 1 was the most fixated location (average proportion fixation time of .43), an unsurprising result given that subjects had to inspect that location to see how the two alternative feature values displayed there were mapped to the left and right response buttons (e.g., Figure 1C ). What is more important is that inference subjects split the remainder of their fixation time about equally between the category label and the two feature dimensions not being queried, namely, Dimensions 2 and 3. The remaining panels tell a similar story. Regardless of whether Dimension 2 ( Figure  4D ) or 3 (4E) was queried, subjects fixated the other, nonqueried feature dimensions. This is in contrast to the classification subjects, who allocated nearly zero fixations to Dimensions 2 and 3 at the end of A-B training and to Dimensions 1 and 3 at the end of C-D training ( Figure 4A ).
Whereas it was expected that inference subjects would fixate the category label, it was unnecessary for them to fixate the other feature dimensions because they provided no information about the value of the missing feature. But rather than optimizing attention and focusing on the category label alone, Figure 4 indicates that inference subjects continued to fixate those other feature dimensions through the final training block. Of course, attending to Dimension 3 may enable the inference learners to perform well on the novel contrasts presented later in the experiment, a possibility we examine below.
For these and all other statistical tests on proportion fixation times, we transformed the non-normal distributions with log odds (Barr, 2008) .
1 To test for differences in eye movements in Figure 4 , we conducted a 2 ϫ 3 ϫ 9 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task (classification vs. inference), dimension (1-3), and block (1-9) as factors, averaging over query location. As expected given Figure 4 , the three-way interaction was both large, p 2 ϭ .66, and reliable, F(16, 336) ϭ 41.207, MSE ϭ 0.000, p Ͻ .01, indicating that eye fixations depended on task and training block. Accordingly, we conducted separate follow-up ANOVAs for the two tasks and the two training phases. For the classification task, we conducted 3 ϫ 5 and 3 ϫ 4 ANOVAS for A-B and C-D training, respectively, with feature dimension and block as factors. We found that both revealed main effects of dimension, p 2 ϭ . For the inference condition, we conducted a 4 ϫ 5 ANOVA for A-B training blocks, with the four abstract locations (three feature dimensions and category label) and block serving as withinsubjects factors. For this analysis, we removed fixations to the dimension being queried and then recalculated block-level average fixation times. The analysis revealed no reliable differences in fixations to the four locations, indicating that subjects were processing the nonqueried feature dimensions as much as the category label even though the former were uninformative about the missing feature. There were no reliable interactions, Fs Ͻ 1. Similarly, a 4 ϫ 4 ANOVA on the four blocks of C-D training did not find a reliable effect of location, F(3, 30) ϭ 1.25, MSE ϭ 4.713, or of block, F(3, 30) ϭ 1.93, MSE ϭ 0.417, and no interaction, F Ͻ 1. We consider reasons for this (lack of) difference in the Discussion.
Novel contrast performance. Learning a concept is often thought of as learning to classify objects into contrasting categories. As people improve in classifying, they optimize attention to the most relevant dimensions, as observed in both A-B and C-D classification training in the current experiment and in multiple prior experiments. In contrast, in the inference condition learners continued to fixate all feature dimensions on each inference trial, including those not being queried. As a result, we predicted that inference training would yield more flexible category representations than classification training. Accordingly, Figure 3B presents both the inference and classification groups' classification performance on the novel contrasts presented in Blocks 10 -13. Recall that novel contrasts (e.g., As vs. Cs) required information on Dimension 3, which the classification group learned to ignore during training. Note that the following analysis is a strict test of the hypothesis that inference learning leads to more flexible category representations, because it does not credit inference learners for engaging in a new task (for the previous 9 blocks inference learners were predicting features rather than classifying). It will be noteworthy if inference learners outperform classification learners in what is (for them) a new task. Figure 3B shows that inference learners, in fact, performed better than classification learners on the novel contrast blocks. A 4 ϫ 2 mixed ANOVA confirmed a reliable effect of block, p 2 ϭ .36, F(3, 63) ϭ 11.97, MSE ϭ 0.003, and task, p 2 ϭ .33, F(1, 21) ϭ 10.24, MSE ϭ 0.026, and of their interaction, p 2 ϭ .30, F(3, 63) ϭ 9.09, MSE ϭ 0.003, ps Ͻ .01. Whereas the classification group achieved an accuracy of .76 on the first block of novel contrasts, the accuracy of the inference group was nearly perfect, .97. The effect of training task on performance in the first novel contrast block was significant, t(21) ϭ 5.30, p Ͻ .01, and large, p 2 ϭ .57. In other words, despite the new task, inference learners 1 Because subjects devoted zero fixations to some locations on some trials, we used the empirical logit defined as ln [(y i ϩ .5)/(n -y i ϩ .5)], where y i is the number of observations to location i and n is the total number of observations (Agresti, 2002; Barr, 2008) . We assume that each observation corresponds to one 5-ms sample of the eye tracker. Thus, if one multiplies both the numerator and denominator in the above expression by .002 (the duration of each sample), the transformation becomes ln [( pf i ϩ .001)/(rt -pf i ϩ .001)], where pf i is the proportion of time fixating location i and rt is the trial's total response time.
were much more effective than classification learners at applying their knowledge of As, Bs, Cs, and Ds to new category contrasts. Figure 3B also shows that inference learners' accuracy remained at ceiling during the four novel contrast blocks, F(1, 10) ϭ 1.96, MSE ϭ 0.000, p Ͼ .05. By comparison, classification learners improved from their first novel contrast block, M ϭ .76, to their last, M ϭ .93, F(1, 11) ϭ 20.21, MSE ϭ 0.009, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .65. These results confirm our suspicion that attention optimization trades off with classification flexibility. Although classification subjects optimized performance by ignoring irrelevant information, doing so apparently resulted in their acquiring less information about the categories (including which values As, Bs, Cs, and Ds tended to have on the critical Dimension 3). In addition, their practice of ignoring Dimension 3 may have continued into the novel contrasts, making good performance (and additional learning) harder. Eye movements during novel contrasts, presented in Figures 4B (classification condition) and 4F (inference condition), confirm this conjecture. First note that during the novel contrasts, both groups devoted most of their fixation time to the category label itself (required to determine whether to respond with the left or right button), just as classification subjects did during A-B and C-D training ( Figure 4A ). But what is more important is that the two groups strongly differed in their time spent fixating Dimension 3. Whereas the inference group devoted their remaining fixation time almost exclusively to Dimension 3, the classification learners initially allocated more fixations to Dimensions 1 and 2. Indeed, on the first novel contrast block, classification learners devoted only .09 of their fixation time to the critical Dimension 3. Clearly, ignoring the feature needed to distinguish two categories on many of the novel contrasts makes highly accurate classification performance impossible. In fact, in the first novel contrast block we found that the classification group was much worse on those novel contrasts that required Dimension 3 compared with those that could be distinguished on the basis of Dimensions 1 and 2 (M ϭ .62 vs. .89). In comparison, the inference learners were virtually perfect on both types of contrasts (.98 and .96) .
A 3 (feature dimension) ϫ 2 (task) ϫ 4 (block) ANOVA of the eye fixations in Figures 4B and 4F Novel contrasts versus A-B and C-D learning. Was the classification group's performance on novel contrasts harmed by classification training in absolute terms or only relative to inference training? To answer this question we compared the inference and classification subjects' first few novel contrasts to initial performance during A-B and C-D classification training.
First, Figure 5A presents accuracy in the first block of novel contrasts for the inference and classification groups, with the latter group's first block of A-B and C-D training divided into subblocks (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) . During both A-B and C-D training, classification subjects were, as expected, near chance in the first sub-block. In contrast, the classification and inference groups were above chance during the first sub-block of novel contrast trials, as both groups initially experienced positive transfer from the previous training. However, while both groups benefited, inference subjects benefited more (M ϭ .91 vs. .77), t(21) ϭ 2.21, p Ͻ .05. There was also evidence that novel contrast performance of the classification group was harmed by prior training. Figure 5A reveals that classification learners did not improve during the first block of novel contrasts, F Ͻ 1. Second, Figure 5B presents eye fixations to the most relevant dimension during each phase, as a function of training task and sub-block-to Dimension 3 for the first block of novel contrasts and to Dimensions 1 and 2 during the first block of A-B and C-D classification training, respectively. The figure shows that the inference group was more likely to fixate Dimension 3 throughout the first block of novel contrasts. Indeed, in the first sub-block the classification learners were virtually ignoring Dimension 3. A 2 ϫ 4 ANOVA with training task and sub-block as factors confirmed an effect of task, p 2 ϭ .82, F(1, 21) ϭ 97.24, MSE ϭ 5.821, p Ͻ .01; an effect of sub-block, p 2 ϭ .30, F(3, 63) ϭ 8.89, MSE ϭ .649, p Ͻ .01, confirms that fixations to Dimension 3 increased over the first block.
However, especially revealing are the classification learners' fixations to Dimension 3 during the first sub-block of novel contrasts compared with Dimension 1 during A-B training. Because A-B reflects a baseline (the start of the experiment), the difference in fixations between it and the novel contrasts measures learned inattention. In fact, a 2 (A-B vs. novel contrast) ϫ 4 (sub-block) ANOVA confirmed that classification learners were less likely to fixate Dimension 3 at the start of the novel contrasts than they were to fixate Dimension 1 at the start of A-B training, p 2 ϭ .44, F(1, 11) ϭ 8.58, MSE ϭ 0.052, p Ͻ .05; in this analysis there was an effect of sub-block, p 2 ϭ .51, F(3, 33) ϭ 11.30, MSE ϭ 0.037, p Ͻ .01, indicating a shift to the relevant dimension, and no interaction, F Ͻ 1. Of course, learned inattention to Dimension 3 is consistent with poor performance on those novel contrasts that required that dimension and an absence of learning in the first novel contrast block ( Figure 5A ).
Note that a similar pattern of learned inattention is revealed by comparing fixations between A-B and C-D training. Recall that the relevant dimension switches between A-B and C-D training and the first block of C-D training shows a reduction in fixations to the relevant dimension compared with A-B training. However, the magnitude of learned inattention in C-D is less than in the novel contrasts, consistent with number of preceding classification trials.
In summary, our analyses of eye movements confirm our expectation that the narrow attention profile induced by supervised classification learning results in inflexible category representations. Note that Figures 4 and 5B present eye movements at a coarse level, averaging over a whole trial, over blocks and subblocks. The Appendix presents finer grained analyses of the dynamics of attention within trials. These additional analyses support the same conclusion that the highly optimized pattern of attention during classification training transfers poorly to novel contrasts.
Discussion
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that classification training produces less flexible category representations because learners optimize their attention for a particular category contrast, thus yielding poorer performance on other contrasts. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that subjects trained to infer features were more successful on the novel contrasts compared with those trained to classify. This difference obtained even though both groups of subjects were exposed to the same data-that is, the same exemplars from Categories A, B, C, and D. What differed was that one group predicted missing features, whereas the other group predicted missing category labels. Apparently, the supervised classification task yields representations that may not generalize as well to novel contrasts. It is notable that inference learners were not just better than the classification group but virtually perfect on the first six novel contrasts, a remarkable result given that these subjects were classifying for the first time in the experiment. Depending on the learner's goals, the flexibility resulting from inference training could reflect a more useful category representation than classification training.
We suggest that the greater flexibility found in the inference condition had two sources. First, the nature of the learning task affects what category information gets encoded. Whereas classifiers could optimize attention to the single dimension that predicted category membership, the inference subjects were required to predict all feature dimensions; experience with the critical Dimension 3 undoubtedly helped them on the novel contrasts. Moreover, eye movement data established that inference subjects fixated not only the feature dimension being queried on the current trial but also the other, nonqueried dimensions, a practice that likely led to additional learning of Dimension 3. The result was that the inference subjects achieved near perfect performance on the subsequent novel contrasts.
Why did the inference subjects attend to the nonqueried feature dimensions if they were unhelpful for accurate inference performance? One explanation is that subjects knew that those dimensions would be queried on future trials, so they strove to learn them on the current trial. That is, on each trial subjects not only learned the feature they predicted and received feedback on (supervised learning), but they also learned features for which they received no feedback (unsupervised learning). Consistent with this anticipatory learning account, Rehder, Colner, and Hoffman (2009) had subjects predict only a subset of a category's features and found that they fixated only those feature dimensions predicted on the current and on future trials and ignored the never-queried features. We provide an additional test of this account in Experiment 2.
A second reason for the greater flexibility in the inference condition is that classification training induced a state of learned inattention in which subjects virtually ignored the critical Dimension 3 during the early novel contrasts. Ignoring Dimension 3 not only precluded perfect performance on the novel contrasts, it also likely contributed to the classification group's slower learning during the novel contrasts compared with A-B and C-D learning-one must attend to a cue to learn which outcome it predicts. Of course, because A-B, C-D, and the novel contrasts are not perfectly comparable (the former two tasks require distinguishing just two categories, whereas the latter requires four), one might expect slower learning during the latter. However, the classification group's complete absence of improvement during the first novel contrast block is a striking result-one readily explained by the fact that they ignored just that information required for better performance.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, the feature inference task resulted in better performance on novel contrasts than classification training. We attributed this result to the inference learners' greater learning of the critical contrast Dimension 3 during training and to the classification group's learned inattention to that dimension during the novel contrasts. In Experiment 2 we conducted another test of the learned inattention hypothesis by equating the classification and inference groups on their need to attend to Dimension 3. We accomplished this by changing the inference task so that Dimension 3 was never queried. If the anticipatory learning account ) is correct, then not querying Dimension 3 should reduce learning of that dimension, reducing the inference group's advantage on the novel contrasts relative to the classification group. However, if the classification group but not the inference group also experiences learned inattention as we claim, then the classification group should continue to exhibit relatively worse novel contrast performance.
We introduced one other change to address a potential concern regarding our interpretation of eye movements during inference learning. As mentioned, Experiment 1's inference learners attended to the nonqueried feature dimensions on each inference trial, a finding we interpreted as desire to learn about those dimensions (because they would be queried on future trials). Nevertheless, a more mundane explanation is that those fixations merely reflected a need to search the display to determine which dimension was being queried. Recall that inference training consisted of three types of randomly interleaved trials, one for each dimension. As a result, at the start of an inference trial the subject's first job was to locate the queried dimension. So, fixations to nonqueried dimensions might merely reflect this search. Accordingly, a second change in Experiment 2 was to signal which dimension was being queried by dashing the line leading from the fixation point to the queried dimension, eliminating any need to search the display. As a result of this change, fixations to nonqueried dimensions will provide stronger evidence that subjects are trying to learn those dimensions.
Method
Twenty-four New York University students participated for course credit. They were tested individually and assigned randomly, in equal numbers, to classification and inference tasks. The methods was identical to that of Experiment 1 with the following changes.
Because Dimension 3 was never queried, the number of trials per block was reduced from 24 to 16. The classification condition's trials per block was also set to 16 (each exemplar was presented four times, twice per label-presentation order). Thus, the total number of training trials was 144 trials in Experiment 2, compared with 216 in Experiment 1.
To remove inference learners' uncertainty about which feature dimension was being queried, we signaled the dimension by a dashed line that extended from the fixation point to that location. Inference subjects were not told ahead of time which feature dimensions would be queried. To make the conditions comparable, we had a dashed line that extended to the category label in the classification condition (see Figure 6 for examples).
Novel contrast blocks now contained 32 trials (rather than 24 as in Experiment 1), with every possible novel contrast tested twice. Because the important question concerns performance on the initial novel contrasts, the number of novel contrast blocks was reduced from four to two.
Results
Learning. Figure 7A presents accuracy during A-B (Blocks 1-5) and C-D (Blocks 6 -9) training and shows the same basic effects as in Experiment 1. During A-B training, accuracy improved in the classification condition and when inference subjects were predicting Dimension 1. Inference learners' Dimension 1 accuracy in the last A-B block (.84, SD ϭ .27) was again marginally lower than classification accuracy (.98, SD ϭ .03), t(22) ϭ 1.81, p Ͻ .10. Similarly, during C-D training, accuracy improved in the classification condition and when inference subjects were predicting Dimension 2; Block 9 performance on the latter (.77, SD ϭ .30) was lower than the former (.98, SD ϭ .04), t(11) ϭ 2.42, p Ͻ .05. As required by the category structure (Table 1) , inference learners performed at chance on Dimension 2 during A-B training and on Dimension 1 during C-D training.
Basic eye movement statistics. Basic eye movements were similar to those in Experiment 1. The average median time per fixation across subjects was 247 ms (SD ϭ 34.56), and the average median saccade amplitude was 7.48 degrees of visual angle (SD ϭ 1.69), close to the 8-degree average distance between locations in the display. Again this was the second most frequent amplitudethe most frequent being around 1 degree (from saccades made within or near stimulus locations). On average there were 8.5 fixations per trial (SD ϭ 1.74). Once again, eye movements were highly regular and reflected the structure of the stimuli.
Fixations: A-B and C-D.
The left hand panels of Figure 8 show the proportion of fixations to the category label and the three feature dimensions during training as a function of location queried and training task. Eye movements in the classification condition ( Figure 8A ) replicated those found in Experiment 1 and earlier work. At the beginning of A-B training, the classification learners fixated the feature dimensions about equally and then shifted fixations from the irrelevant Dimensions 2 and 3 to the relevant Dimension 1, until by Block 5 the irrelevant dimensions were rarely fixated. Similarly, fixations during C-D training shifted toward the (now) relevant Dimension 2.
In contrast, fixations during inference training ( Figures 8C and  8D ) exhibited a different pattern than that observed in either classification training or inference training in Experiment 1. Recall that the current experiment differs from the first in that Dimension 3 was never queried and the dashed line told subjects which dimension was being queried. On the anticipatory learning account, inference subjects should fixate only those sometimesqueried dimensions (1 and 2), even if they are not presently queried, and ignore the never-queried one (3). This is what occurred. Figures 8C and 8D show that during both A-B and C-D training, inference learners fixated the sometimes-queried dimension (i.e., Dimension 2 when Dimension 1 was queried and Dimension 1 when Dimension 2 was queried); indeed, these dimensions were fixated about as much (.12) as the category label itself (.14). In contrast, fixations to Dimension 3 were quickly eliminated as subjects learned it was never queried, a finding consistent with the anticipatory learning account. Note that Figures 8C and 8D also show the usual result that the queried feature dimension itself (necessary for subjects to know whether to respond with the left or right response key) was the most fixated feature.
The training eye movements in Figure 8 were submitted to a 2 ϫ 3 ϫ 9 ANOVA, with task (classification vs. inference), feature dimension (1-3), and block (1-9) For the inference condition, we conducted a 4 ϫ 5 ANOVA of the A-B training blocks, with the four locations (three feature dimensions and category label) and block serving as factors. As in Experiment 1, we first removed fixations to the dimension being queried before recalculating block-level average fixations times. There were effects of location, p 2 ϭ .54, F(6, 66) ϭ 12.70, MSE ϭ 4.745, and of block, p 2 ϭ .31, F(4, 44) ϭ 4.99, MSE ϭ .550, and an interaction, p 2 ϭ .27, F(12, 132) ϭ 4.094, MSE ϭ .472, reflecting that subjects stopped fixating Dimension 3 as they learned it was never queried. Indeed, the proportion of time learners spent fixating Dimension 3 during the last block of A-B training was not reliably greater than zero, t Ͻ 1. In a 4 ϫ 4 ANOVA of C-D inference training there was an effect of location, p 2 ϭ .62, F(6, 66) ϭ 12.70, MSE ϭ 4.745, but no other effects, Fs Ͻ 1, reflecting that subjects continued to almost completely ignore Dimension 3 during C-D training. Novel contrast performance. In Experiment 1 we found that the inference group was better able to apply their category knowledge to new contrasts (and to a new task)-a result we attributed to inference learners' attention to Dimension 3 throughout learning and classification learners' attention optimization away from Dimension 3. Never querying Dimension 3 in Experiment 2 made it as irrelevant to inference training as it was to classification, and indeed few fixations were allocated to that dimension by either group. As a result, performance on the novel category contrasts may now be equal across conditions. However, unlike the classification learners, inference learners did not have to undergo arduous trial-and-error learning to discover that Dimension 3 was not relevant. They only had to learn that it was not part of the task; they did not have to learn to attend away from it. One possibility is that in the absence of such learned inattention, the inference group may redirect attention to Dimension 3 more readily, and they may thus maintain their advantage on novel contrasts. Figure 7B presents accuracy on novel contrasts (Blocks 10 and 11). Despite not querying Dimension 3 during training, the inference learners still achieved better novel contrast performance (overall accuracy of .94) compared with the classification learners (.82). This result is remarkable given that the inference learners were not only engaging in a novel task, but they were also ignoring Dimension 3 during training at least as much as the classification learners. A 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA of the data in Figure 7B revealed a main effect of task, p 2 ϭ .20, F(1, 22) ϭ 5.32, MSE ϭ .023, p Ͻ .05, reflecting better performance in the inference condition than in the classification condition. There was also a main effect of block, p 2 ϭ .29, F(1, 22) ϭ 8.76, MSE ϭ .000, p Ͻ .05, reflecting that both conditions improved from the first novel contrast block to the second. There was no interaction. As in Experiment 1, inference learners were more effective than classification learners at applying their knowledge of As, Bs, Cs, and Ds to new category contrasts.
Eye movement data presented in Figures 8B (classification condition) and 8E (inference condition) reveal how the patterns of attention learned during training transferred to the novel contrasts. The figures indicate that the inference group was far more likely to fixate the critical Dimension 3; indeed, in the first novel contrast block the inference group was virtually ignoring Dimensions 1 and 2. Inference learners' immediate and exclusive use of Dimension 3 indicates that ignoring a dimension during learning does not entail difficulty in using that dimension in the future. In comparison, the classification group fixated Dimension 3 about as much as the other feature dimensions. As in Experiment 1, we asked whether the classification group's relatively few fixations to Dimension 3 would manifest in performance on the different types of novel contrasts. In fact, on the first novel contrast block the classification group was once again worse on those novel contrasts that required Dimension 3 than on those that did not (accuracy of .74 vs. .91). In contrast, the inference group was about equally accurate on these items (.92 and .94) .
A 2 (condition) ϫ 3 (feature dimension) ϫ 2 (block) ANOVA of the data in Figures 8B and 8E revealed an interaction between condition and dimension, p 2 ϭ .28, F(2, 44) ϭ 8.71, MSE ϭ 2.680, reflecting greater use of Dimension 3 in the inference condition, and an interaction between dimension and block, p 2 ϭ .40, F(2, 44) ϭ 14.52, MSE ϭ .545, reflecting that use of Dimension 3 increased (and use of Dimensions 1 and 2 decreased) from the first novel contrast block to the second (all ps Ͻ .01).
Novel contrasts versus A-B and C-D learning. Following Experiment 1, we also asked whether the classification group's novel contrast performance was harmed in absolute terms or only relative to the inference group. Figure 9A presents classification performance during the first 16 novel contrasts aggregated over sub-blocks of four trials each. The figure also includes initial A-B and C-D classification performance for comparison. In contrast to their initial chance performance during A-B and C-D training, the classification group's novel contrast performance was above chance (accuracy of .65) on the first sub-block, reflecting the benefit of prior training, though still reliably worse than that of the inference learners (.79), t(21) ϭ 2.53, p Ͻ .01 (after an extreme outlier in the inference group was removed; otherwise p ϭ .11). Accuracy in both conditions then improved over the ensuing novel contrasts. Note that this improvement by the classification learners contrasts with those in Experiment 1 who showed no improvement over the initial novel contrasts ( Figure 5A ). We consider explanations for this difference below. Figure 9B presents fixations to Dimension 3 for the first block of novel contrasts as a function of training task and sub-block. For comparison, the figure includes fixations to Dimensions 1 and 2 during the first block of A-B and C-D classification training, respectively. First, note that Figure 9B shows that the inference group spent more time than the classification group fixating the relevant Dimension 3 during all the initial novel contrasts, including the first sub-block. The main effect of training task on eye fixations was confirmed by a 2 ϫ 4 ANOVA, with task and sub-block as factors, p 2 ϭ .20, F(1, 22) ϭ 5.46, MSE ϭ 7.281, p Ͻ .05. The analysis found an increase in Dimension 3 fixations over sub-blocks, p 2 ϭ .28, F(3, 63) ϭ 8.52, MSE ϭ 1.220, p Ͻ .01, and no interaction, F Ͻ 1.
More important, Figure 9B also shows that classification learners were less likely to fixate Dimension 3 during novel contrasts than Dimension 1 during initial A-B training. Again, because A-B training reflects a baseline for fixations to a feature dimension, this difference measures learned inattention, p 2 ϭ .48, F(1, 11) ϭ 10.23, MSE ϭ 3.764, p Ͻ .01. Of course, learned inattention to Dimension 3 explains the classification subjects' poor performance on those novel contrasts that required Dimension 3. In this analysis, there was also an increase in fixations to the relevant dimensions during the initial novel contrasts, p 2 ϭ .45, F(3, 33) ϭ 8.41, MSE ϭ 0.644, p Ͻ .01. Nevertheless, there was some evidence that learned inattention was not as strong in this experiment compared with the first experiment. The fixation time to Dimension 3 on the first four novel contrasts was twice as large here as that in Experiment 1 (.07 vs. .03). In addition, relevant fixations during initial novel contrasts were lower than during initial C-D training in Experiment 1 but not Experiment 2 ( Figure 5B vs. 9B). One explanation for this difference is the reduced number of classification training trials in this experiment (144 vs. 216 ). This somewhat reduced magnitude of learned inattention may explain the classification learner's improvement during the initial novel contrasts seen in Figure 9A but not in Figure  5A . The Appendix contains an analysis of within-trial attention dynamics, supporting the same conclusion.
The source of learned inattention. Finally, we asked what allowed inference subjects to redirect attention to newly relevant information. In answer to this question, in Figure 10 we present learners' attention allocation to Dimension 3 as a function of trial for the first block of A-B (Trials 1-16) and C-D training (Trials 81-96). The figure shows that the classification learners attended more to Dimension 3 early in learning. In the first 16 trials of A-B training, classification subjects allocated about twice as much fixation time to Dimension 3 (M ϭ .12, SD ϭ .06) as the inference subjects (M ϭ .07, SD ϭ .05), p 2 ϭ .23, F(1, 22) ϭ 6.48, MSE ϭ 20.009, p Ͻ .05, and were slower to ignore Dimension 3, as indicated by a trial by task interaction, p 2 ϭ .10, F(15, 330) ϭ 2.39, MSE ϭ 1.774, p Ͻ .01. Similarly, during C-D training classification subjects allocated more fixations (M ϭ .06, SD ϭ .04) to Dimension 3 than inference subjects (M ϭ .03, SD ϭ .03), p 2 ϭ .15, F(1, 22) ϭ 3.91, MSE ϭ 13.159, p ϭ .061, and were slower to ignore Dimension 3, F(15, 330) ϭ 3.63, MSE ϭ 1.743, p Ͻ .01. (More accurately, this interaction reflects an inverted U-shaped pattern, in which the classification condition first increased and then decreased fixations to Dimension 3.)
These two patterns of attention reflect different reasons for ignoring Dimension 3. Inference subjects ignored it because it was never queried and was therefore not part of the task. Classification subjects learned to ignore it, as they discovered that Dimension 3 did not help them classify As from Bs or Cs from Ds. This explains the initial increase in fixations to Dimension 3 in the first C-D block; classification learners reattended it and then learned that it was useless in classifying Cs and Ds. Classification learners' fixations reflected a learned inattention to Dimension 3, which probably prevented their attending to Dimension 3 on novel contrasts.
Discussion
Experiment 2 further tested the claim that learned inattention contributes to classification learners' poor performance on novel contrasts relative to inference learners. In Experiment 1, we attributed that result not only to learned inattention but also to the fact that the inference task induces a broad attention profile (versus the classification task's narrower one)-an attention profile that naturally enables the encoding of category information required to make novel contrasts. In Experiment 2, we equated the tasks on their need to attend to the contrast Dimension 3 by never asking inference learners to infer a feature on that dimension. That inference learners rarely fixated Dimension 3 during training indicated that this manipulation was effective; indeed, the inference group was less likely than the classification group to fixate that dimension. But despite this difference, the inference learners still exhibited better performance on the novel contrasts than did the classification learners, just as they did in Experiment 1. Analyses of individual novel contrasts indicated that this difference arose because of classification learners' poor performance on just those novel contrasts that required the critical Dimension 3. In addition, eyetracking data again confirmed the classification learners' reluctance to attend to that dimension during the novel contrasts. In the General Discussion we discuss reasons for learned inattention in supervised classification learning in more detail.
General Discussion
Flexible representations-those that support classification in novel contexts-are a necessary property of any intelligent system. On one hand, there are contexts in which people repeatedly classify objects into a small number of categories (for examples, see The Benefits of Supervised Classification below), and it is important, of course, that in those situations our cognitive system performs accurately and efficiently. But objects also appear in novel contexts that require unfamiliar discriminations-that is, distinguishing a set of contrast categories that have never previously appeared together. Choosing effective courses of action requires accuracy on these novel contrasts.
In this research we investigated the effect of learning task on the resulting flexibility of conceptual representations. Our focus was on the central task in laboratory studies of category acquisition. Experimental studies of the supervised classification task have had the most influence on current theories of categorization, and dozens of computational models have been proposed to account for the large database of empirical findings. And yet it is not always clear how the category representations induced in such studies map onto the kinds of categories that people learn and reason with every day (Murphy, 2005) . In fact, these previous studies suggested to us that supervised classification learning is likely to produce inflexible representations that are effective for the discriminations on which people are trained but not for novel contrasts. To assess this hypothesis, we compared classification learning with feature inference learning that previous research suggested might lead to the acquisition of more complete representations. As expected, our two experiments found that subjects trained via supervised classification learning were less accurate on new discriminations. Whatever their virtues, representations produced by supervised classification learning alone are insufficient to support the novel contrasts that the human cognitive system carries out every day.
In the remainder of this article we consider, first, the reasons for the relatively poor transfer performance from supervised classification learning. Our use of eyetracking allowed us to identify two separate costs of classification learning. We then discuss tasks for which supervised classification training will be advantageous. Because inference and classification training yield differences in what people represent conceptually, we discuss the role of attention allocation in explaining these differences and, more generally, how attention allocation can serve as the explanatory variable that mediates what is eventually learned in a task.
Cost 1: Limited Knowledge From Narrow Focus
The first way that classification learning reduces conceptual flexibility is by restricting learners' attention to a small subset of feature dimensions. On the basis of a large body of previous research (e.g., Nosofsky, 1984; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a; Shepard et al., 1961) we predicted, and found, that classification learners quickly allocated eye movements to features that were needed for the initial A-B and C-D discriminations and away from irrelevant features. We also predicted that classification learners would struggle on the ensuing novel contrasts that now required information about the (so-called) irrelevant dimensions, and in fact, in both Experiments 1 and 2, classification learners' performance on novel contrasts lagged behind the performance of those whose training task (feature inference learning) induced a broad attention profile. This result obtained despite (a) exposing both groups to the same exemplars and (b) having inference learners switch to a classification task. So, the powers of selective attention to rapidly produce accurate classification performance have a dark side-namely, representations that fail to generalize well to other discriminations.
It is important to note potential limitations of the category structures we tested. We produced inflexible representations by training classification learners on discriminations that required a single feature dimension. However, because most real-world categories exhibit a family resemblance structure in which no one feature defines category membership, learning to discriminate such categories requires attending to more feature dimensions and, thus, is likely to produce more complete representations. But note that even these representations are likely to be incomplete as long as a learner's goal is only to sort items into a small number of categories. For example, we suspect that a child being pressed by parents to learn the difference between cats and dogs will discover that only a few cues are needed (e.g., body size, ear shape, and "meow" vs. "woof"). Indeed, Hoffman (2008) found that learners shift eye fixations toward those family-resemblance dimensions relevant to that distinction. But although this "training" may placate the adults, it is unlikely to help the child learn that dogs and cats have paws and tails, eat, like affection, breathe, and have dozens of other properties that will be needed to discriminate them from other categories. More experience will be needed to fill the gaps in knowledge that arise from supervised classification learning alone (for ideas, see the Feature Inference Learning section below).
Similarly, one might expect more complete representations to arise when learning categories that are not linearly separable, because such categories require attending to which configurations of features go with which categories. For example, models that can learn nonlinearly separable categories do so by memorizing whole exemplars (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) , forming multiple "clusters" per category (Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004) or learning rules plus exceptions (Nosofsky et al., 1994) , and the storage of exemplars, clusters, and exceptions seems to imply attending to all feature dimensions (also see Yamauchi et al., 2002) . On the other hand, the feature configurations required to learn a nonlinearly separable distinction may involve only a few dimensions, inviting learners to focus on those. For example, the standard explanation of the well known result from Shepard et al. (1961) that subjects learn categories defined by an exclusive-or on two of three dimensions (the "Type II" structure) faster than expected is that subjects ignored the third irrelevant dimension (Kruschke, 1992; Shepard et al., 1961) . This conjecture been confirmed by eye movement data for the Type II structure (Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a) . Subjects can also learn to attend only to two exclusive-or dimensions even when embedded in 5-dimensional stimuli (Hoffman, 2008) . These results imply that incomplete representations (and thus poor generalization to novel contrasts) can occur with at least some nonlinearly separable categories.
Another caveat concerns the stimuli we tested. Not all objects are composed of dimensions that are as spatially separated as in our "ceremonial symbols" (Figure 1) , and the learning deficit experienced by classification learners might have been less pronounced with spatially integrated features. Consistent with this conjecture, Allen and Brooks (1991) found that subjects learned additional information about the environment in which category members (schematic animals) appeared even with prior knowledge of the correct classification rule. Attention devoted to searching for the animal in its environment was sufficient to encode that addi-tional information (also see Brooks, Squire-Graydon, & Wood, 2007; Thibaut & Geisler, 2006) . On the other hand, there are many objects composed of "parts" that appear in predictable locations, so that some parts can be attended to at the expense of others. (Indeed, Allen and Brooks, 1991 , found that context learning was eliminated when items were presented at a fixed position.) In addition, it is well known that people can selectively focus on "separable" dimensions even when those dimensions are spatially integrated in the same object (Garner, 1978) .
Although this article emphasizes the incomplete representations produced by supervised classification training, it is important to recognize that this training nevertheless transferred positively to the novel contrasts. The classification groups not only did well on those contrasts that could be answered on the basis of Dimensions 1 or 2 (Block 10 accuracy of .89 and .91 in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively), but they also were above chance on contrasts that required Dimension 3 (.62 and .74), demonstrating some learning about how that dimension covaried with category membership. Moreover, supervised classification can yield more learning than other procedures. For example, Bott, Hoffman, and Murphy (2007) found that learners acquired more information when predicting an outcome they knew to be a category label compared with predicting a meaningless outcome (a low or high tone). This occurred despite the use of a "blocking" paradigm in which both groups of subjects were first trained on a single cue that predicted the outcome perfectly (also see Hoffman & Murphy, 2006) . But although people learn more when they are predicting category labels compared with meaningless outcomes, note that Bott et al.'s subjects still learned less than half of the category's features.
We have focused on how failure to attend to category information prevents novel discriminations, but of course failure to attend also prevents other sorts of inferences. For example, discriminations will be required at other levels of abstractions. Although not useful for distinguishing roses and raspberry bushes, failure to note that both have thorns prevents discriminating between thorned and not-thorned plants in the future. In addition, impoverished category representations prevent the category-based inductions that are the main reason for learning categories. Below we review evidence that, compared with supervised classification, inference learning instills internal category knowledge (e.g., prototypical features and interfeature correlations) that supports predictions about missing features in objects.
Cost 2: Learned Inattention
Whereas the first cost concerns what is learned about categories, the second concerns what is learned about attention-that is, how a learned pattern of attention transfers to subsequent learning. Analysis of eye movements revealed that Experiment 1's classification learners not only learned to ignore a feature dimension during training, but they also continued to ignore it when presented with novel discriminations even though that information was critical to good performance. Of course, one likely consequence of this learned inattention was that, even if the classifiers learned something about Dimension 3 during training, it prevented them from using that knowledge (predicting an outcome on the basis of a cue-outcome association requires attending to the cue). Another is that it slowed the classification group's learning of the novel contrasts in Experiment 1 (one must attend to a cue to learn a new cue-outcome association). To further demonstrate that classification learners were experiencing a deficit of not only category knowledge but also of attention, Experiment 2 equated the classification and inference tasks so that neither required knowledge of the critical Dimension 3. Once again we found that classification learners exhibited a reluctance to attend to that information-and thus there was poorer performance on the novel contrasts. The second cost of supervised classification learning is that it trains classifiers to ignore information that might become relevant later.
The phenomenon of learned inattention is not new, of course-it relates to classic learning phenomena such as latent inhibition (Lubow, 1989) , blocking (Kamin, 1969) , and highlighting (Kruschke, 1996b; Medin & Edelson, 1988) , and surrounding theory (Kruschke, 2001 (Kruschke, , 2003 Kruschke & Blair, 2000; Mackintosh, 1975; Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971 ). All three phenomena occur when cues are paired with other cues that are more predictive or salient, and it is found that learning of any such cues is reduced. In fact, latent inhibition corresponds exactly to the classification condition found in Experiments 1 and 2, where once irrelevant cues become relevant. Latent inhibition predicts that learning about previously irrelevant cues is hard-a fact we verified in our experiments.
Attention learning theory (Mackintosh, 1975; Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971) , as far as we know, does the best job in accounting for latent inhibition, standard and backward blocking, and highlighting. On this account, people shift attention toward those dimensions that reduce error and away from those dimensions that increase error. Kruschke and colleagues implemented formal descriptions of attention learning theory, combining them with models of category learning in EXIT (Kruschke & Blair, 2000; RASHNL, Kruschke & Johansen, 1999) , and as a result were able to account for these phenomena and the benchmark classification data that all formal theories must account for. Thus, classification tasks that contain irrelevant dimensions produce rigid category representations because the attentional demands of the task allow the learner to reduce the number of attended dimensions to the minimum, which in turn makes learning about previously irrelevant dimensions hard.
Experiment 2 also revealed that although learned inattention harmed the transfer performance of the classification learners, it did not for the inference learners. Although eye movement data showed that the inference group largely ignored the never-queried Dimension 3 during training (in fact, they fixated it even less than the classification group), they immediately allocated attention to this newly relevant information when required to make novel contrasts. Apparently, learned inattention is not just not attending. We suggest that learned inattention arises in classification learning when attention shifts away from nonpredictive cues on the basis of error feedback (Kruschke, 2003) . The inference learners, in contrast, stopped fixating Dimension 3 not because of error feedback but because they realized that it was not being queried. These observations suggest that how a learner acquires an attention profile is as important as the profile itself.
The Benefits of Supervised Classification: Categorization as Cognitive Skill
In summary then, the attention profile induced by traditional supervised classification learning tends to limit both what one learns about a category and what one attends in the future, factors that work against novel discriminations. However, this is not to say that this sort of (overly) optimized attention is always bad. Indeed, the expertise literature is rife with classification scenarios for which supervised learning seems suitable-namely, those that involve repeatedly categorizing items into few categories. For example, expert chick sexers must examine the vent region of 800 to 1,200 one-day-old chickens per hour and accurately identify their sex. The demands of chick sexing are similar to those of the standard supervised classification learning task: There are two categories, extensive training is required (Horsey, 2002) , and the only goal is to sort. Examples of such expert classification are commonplace (e.g., wine and coffee tasters who discriminate among varietals, region, year). Moreover, expert classification involves the same sort of attention optimization that characterizes supervised classification learning. For example, in the well known study of Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1981) , expert but not novice physics problem solvers ignored problems' superficial features and attended instead to underlying principles.
We suggest that expert classification resulting from extended supervised learning is a cognitive skill, an ability that emerges after long practice to perform efficiently and accurately. In this light, it is easy to see how the costs of supervised classification become benefits instead. Attention optimization yields high levels of performance by filtering out irrelevant information, and eyetracking studies have indeed demonstrated that skilled performance involves ignoring irrelevant cues (Haider & Frensch, 1999; Lee & Anderson, 2001 ). Learned inattention is also unproblematic here because extended training exposes experts to a wide range of problems, which allows them to determine all necessary information for the task. (After years of training, there is little chance that a chick-sexer will suddenly need new information to accurately sex chicks.)
Besides expert classification, it is unusual to classify items repeatedly into few categories. Each day we classify thousands of objects, involving hundreds of categories. And while many of these are routine (the toothpaste appears in the same place every morning), many others involve novel contexts and thus novel sets of candidate categories. In these situations the categorizer should, on the fly, allocate attention to the most diagnostic features for the categories in the contrast set. Of course, one would expect that the need to adjust attention dynamically is common in many cognitive tasks, and this is just what has been found. For example, when items are compared (e.g., to assess their similarity), which features are attended to will vary depending on the contrasted items (Markman & Gentner, 1993 Medin, Coley, Storms, & Hayes, 2003; Tversky, 1977) . But dynamic attention requires robust representations that include information on many dimensions-a requirement that supervised classification alone appears ill suited to provide.
Feature Inference Learning
That supervised classification learning would lead to relatively impoverished category representations led us to consider whether feature inference learning had the potential to produce the representations needed for novel contrasts. We not only found that feature inference learning had better performance on novel discriminations (accuracy on novel contrasts Ͼ 90% in both Experiments 1 and 2) compared with supervised classification; in addition, eyetracking allowed us to attribute this performance to the broader spread of attention that the inference task induces and to the absence of learned inattention to irrelevant dimensions that later become relevant.
The inference task yielded broader attention in two ways. First (and not surprising), on each feature inference trial, subjects fixated the queried dimension. Second, on each trial subjects also fixated the feature dimensions that they expected would be queried on future trials (a conclusion supported by our finding that Experiment 2 inference learners quickly stopped fixating a dimension that was not queried). This sort of anticipatory learning by inference learners has been seen before (A. L. Anderson et al., 2002; Rehder et al., 2009; Sakamoto & Love, 2006) .
The notion of anticipatory learning differs from other accounts of the feature inference task. Some researchers have argued that inference learning motivates people to learn what the categories are like, with attention to within-category feature correlations and prototypical information Markman & Ross, 2003; Yamauchi & Markman, 1998) , an account that predicts that learners will fixate most features on most trials, regardless of whether they are ever queried. Others have suggested that feature inference learning simply involves acquiring rule-like associations between the category label and the features (Johansen & Kruschke, 2005 ; also see Nilsson & Olsson, 2005; Sweller & Hayes, in press) , an account that predicts that only the category label and the to-be-predicted dimension are fixated. In contrast, the anticipatory learning account specifies that learners will study that category information they think will be queried about in the future, and this is just what we found in Experiment 2. The benefit, of course, is that this results in the encoding of additional category information that can benefit future contrasts.
One might expect that more complete category representations would have other benefits as well, and research reviewed earlier confirms that this is the case. As mentioned, Chin-Parker and found that inference learners learned prototypical but undiagnostic features better than classification learners. Also, ChinParker and found that inference learners, but not classification learners, learned within-category feature correlations. This latter result is notable because knowledge of the correlations was not required to successfully complete feature inference training. We suspect that these subjects, like our own, fixated most feature dimensions because they were anticipating future queries, and by so doing incidentally encoded the correlations between features (see , for one computational implementation of this idea; also see Minda & Ross, 2004) . That is, as in the current experiments, feature inference learning appears to promote robust representations that can be used for tasks that were not part of initial training (also see Ross, 1999) .
Just as we identified both the costs and benefits of supervised classification, it is important to balance the aforementioned benefits of inference learning against its costs. Perhaps most obvious is the more difficult training of feature inference learning. For example, in both Experiments 1 and 2 inference learners performed worse than the classification group on comparable trials (i.e., when the inference group predicted the valid cue-Dimension 1 for A-B and Dimension 2 for C-D training-from the category label vs. when the classification learners predicted the category label from the valid cue). Moreover, the classification group responded faster than the inference group during training (e.g., in Experiment 2, Ͻ1.5 s vs. Ͼ2.5 s, respectively). In this light, the more complete representations produced by the feature inference task are unsur-prising given the additional cognitive processing that that task apparently induces. In other words, one task's costs are another's benefits; representational flexibility trades off against fast and accurate classification learning. This sort of tradeoff between training difficulty and transfer performance is found in the skill acquisition literature (Schmidt & Bjork, 1992) .
We close by noting that it is likely that people's complete and flexible category representations are formed by means other than feature inference learning. Children do not engage in long, uninterrupted sequences of feature prediction trials any more than they engage in long, uninterrupted sequences of supervised classification trials. For example, unsupervised classification learning may involve less rule-based processing and thus a broader attention profile, promoting the encoding of more category information (at least when learning is incidental; Love, 2002) . Semisupervised learning involving a mixture of trials with and without feedback may also promote a broader attention profile. Children also learn categories by spontaneously naming objects and then receiving feedback. Although naming is a form of supervised classification learning, it does not involve choosing between few categories-because a new object can belong to any category, many features need to be inspected. Finally, supervised classification learning may eventually lead to flexible representations if objects are learned in a variety of contexts and thus contrast sets. In that case, the learner will be forced to attend broadly, mitigating the costs we have documented. But note that although this sort of supervised classification can contribute to the acquisition of flexible categories, it differs from the learning that is typically studied in the laboratory in which subjects only learn to classify items into few categories.
In summary, these considerations indicate that different tasks will direct attention to different aspects of a category's structure. There is a growing interest in understanding the exact relationship between task and what is learned-this study provides a step in that direction and highlights the role that attention allocation can play as useful explanatory variable for how task influences the acquired concept.
Within-Trial Attention Dynamics Experiment 1
Experiment 1 showed how attention and task performance interplayed at the block level. Although the coarse-grain analyses were sufficient to address our main theoretical questions, to inform the development of future models of category learning, we also present an analysis of how attention changes within an individual trial. We examined within-trial patterns of attention at the most theoretically interesting points in the experiment: the end of A-B training (Block 5), the end of C-D training (Block 9), and the beginning of novel contrast classifications (Block 10). Figure A1 contains histograms that represent the probability that a subject fixated each location, on a 50-ms interval. The graphs in the top row show the histograms for the classification condition. In the last block of both A-B and C-D training, classifiers looked at the relevant dimension and the category label (in no clear order) for the first 50 -300 ms. Following this, at around 450 ms, the classifiers generally shifted attention back to the category label before their eventual response, perhaps in anticipation of feedback.
The bottom three rows of Figure A1 show attention allocation in the inference condition when Dimensions 1, 2, and 3 were queried, respectively. In each, fixation probabilities built for the category label and for the nonqueried dimensions relatively early, around 200 ms, and fixations to the queried dimension continued to build through 2,000 ms. Again, these later fixations probably reflected an anticipation of feedback, as these locations displayed the correct answer after the response. One can see from these figures that nonqueried dimensions were frequently fixated. For example, when Dimension 1 was queried there were fixations to the category label and to Dimensions 1 and 2. In contrast, the classification group rarely fixated the irrelevant dimensions.
Mirroring the coarse-grain analyses, in the first block of novel contrasts, the classification group looked at the category label and then at any of the dimensions, with no clear order or preference. In contrast, the inference group typically looked at the category label first to see what contrast was needed; this was followed by a strong peak at around 1,000 ms on Dimension 3, and then a return to the category label before responding. The inference learners virtually ignored Dimensions 1 and 2 during the novel contrasts. Figure A2 presents histograms showing the probability that a subject fixated each location over the course of a trial at the end of Figure A1 . Experiment 1 within-trial probability of fixating the category label and the three dimensions.
Experiment 2

(Appendix continues)
A-B training (Block 5), the end of C-D training (Block 9), and the initial novel contrasts (Block 10). The results generally mirror those of Experiment 1. For the classification condition, the top row of histograms shows that subjects looked at relevant Dimensions 1 and 2 during A-B and C-D training, respectively, and at the category label for the first 50 -300 ms. By 1,000 ms, the classifiers generally shifted attention back to the category label before their eventual response, perhaps in anticipation of feedback.
The next two rows of Figure A2 show attention allocation for inference queries of Dimensions 1 and 2. Attention first peaked for the category label and for the nonqueried dimensions relatively early, around 200 ms, but the peak for the queried dimension continued to build through 2,000 ms. As in Experiment 1, the inference group frequently fixated nonqueried dimensions. As in the block-level analysis, however, fixations to Dimension 3 were rare.
In the first block of novel contrasts, the classification group examined the category label and then the dimensions, with no clear order or preference. In contrast, the inference group typically examined the category label first to see what contrast was needed; this was followed by a strong peak at around 1,000 ms on Dimension 3 and then a return to the category label before responding.
